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Abstract: 
Blockchain represents one of the 21st century’s most impactful inventions. In addition to creating cryptocurrencies 
such as Bitcoin, this technology enables smart contract functionality and supports decentralized, secure, and private 
transactions. By design, blockchains enable decentralized functionality for many of today’s business applications and 
transform traditional centralized information systems. In this paper, we summarize four research areas that will appeal 
to IS scholars that a panel at AMCIS 2018 discussed: 1) cryptocurrency regulation, 2) Etherisc (a smart contract-
based application), 3) decentralized blockchain applications in healthcare, and 4) Bitcoin as a blockchain application 
and issues with decentralization. To account for the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation’s 
requirements to provide people with the right to be forgotten and modify personal data, we modified Pedersen et al.’s 
(2019) framework to accommodate off-chain data storage requirements. We deployed Pedersen et al.’s (2019) 
modified framework to evaluate whether one can use blockchains for three different applications. We summarize 
several research questions and present a research agenda that emerged from the issues highlighted during the panel 
discussion. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Smart Contracts, Ecosystem, Regulation. 
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1 Introduction 
Blockchain participation and adoption is, by design, democratic and unconstrained (Beck, 2018). 
However, blockchain adoption presents several challenges to organizations (Beck & Muller-Bloch, 2017). 
Researchers and practitioners continuously ponder: do blockchains really add business value to 
organizations? Should organizations change their existing application frameworks to decentralized 
blockchain-based models? Furthermore, what regulatory implications will arise when organizations or 
individuals adopt blockchain-based applications that exchange “digital assets”?  
This debate represents a central issue for both information systems (IS) researchers and practitioners 
who endeavor to understand blockchain’s sociotechnical and socioeconomic implications (Cousins, 
Subramanian, & Esmaeilzadeh, 2019). In this paper, we report on a panel discussion at the Americas 
Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) in 2018 that discussed blockchains and information 
systems. The panel occurred amid a larger IS debate on whether to adopt blockchains and the 
implications of such adoption.  
This panel made two important contributions. First, it highlighted key issues pertaining to the ongoing 
debate surrounding regulatory frameworks for blockchain smart assets. Second, it discussed blockchain’s 
usefulness, business viability, and value across several industries. In doing so, it outlined the key 
regulatory implications for blockchain-based financial crypto-assets. Furthermore, it outlined emerging 
opportunities in smart contracts and decentralized applications in the insurance sector, healthcare 
industry, and payment networks. During the panel, the audience asked why blockchain technology was a 
good fit for the applications we presented. To explore this idea, we used the framework that Pedersen, 
Risius, and Beck (2019) developed, which provides guidelines for assessing whether blockchain 
technology suits each case. However, Pedersen et al.’s (2019) framework does not account for the 
European General Data Protection Regulation’s (GDPR) requirements to give individuals the right to 
modify or permanently delete personal data. We suggest how one could modify Pederson et al.’s (2019) 
framework in this panel report. We then use the adapted framework as a lens to assess whether one can 
use blockchain technology for the applications the panel presented. Furthermore, we develop a research 
agenda based on the panel discussion.  
2 Blockchain: Background and Significance 
Blockchain-based systems have many different applications such as in supply chain management, 
Internet of things (IoT), and artificial intelligence (AI) systems that use automated reasoning 
(Subramanian, 2017). Due to blockchain’s decentralization, immutability, security, and openness, it 
provides the ideal infrastructure for sharing data across different types of inter-organizational systems that 
require a permanent record of transmitted transactions that participating organizations can access. Such 
applications include supply chain transactional systems created over value-added networks and health 
information exchanges (HIEs). Blockchain can also guarantee user privacy in sensor- and IoT-based 
networks (Chanson, Bogner, Bilgeri, Fleisch, & Wortmann, 2019). Blockchain applications that focus on 
product certification such as organic produce allow one to add transactions about that product, from the 
farm to the customer’s table, to the blockchain as they occur (e.g., Wyoming’s beefchain.com, which 
certifies organic beef products). Blockchain’s decentralized structure allows one to replace trusted third 
parties such as financial intermediaries and governing bodies with algorithmic forms of trust (Beck, 
Stenum Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016). 
Blockchain also shows promise in implementing legal documents such as an individual’s will where a 
trusted third party receives a fee upon execution. If one implemented a will as a smart contract, then the 
contract could monitor a government mortality database and distribute resources when it discovers a 
certified death. Other examples where blockchains can replace third-party intermediaries include vehicle 
titles, land titles, marriage certificates, fishing licenses, intellectual property registers, and financial 
instruments. 
One can use various operating parameters (e.g., mining power and hashing rate) and algorithms (e.g., 
proof of stake, proof of work, proof of data, and distributed proof of stake) to configure blockchains. 
Blockchain developers and firms use two kinds of blockchains to develop large-scale applications: 
permissioned and permission-less blockchains. They use hyperledger blockchains to implement private, 
permissioned, or permissioned-private enterprise business applications. Similarly, organizations use 
Ethereum, Bitcoin, EoS, and Monero blockchains to implement public and permission-less smart contract-
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based distributed applications (DApps). However, blockchain applications also introduce new risks and 
interoperability challenges with existing systems (Rossi, Mueller-Bloch, Thatcher, & Beck, 2019), which 
suggests the need for further research into performance, appropriate use cases, risks and regulatory 
issues, incentive mechanisms, and interoperability among blockchains and other information systems 
(Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017; Beck, Müller-Bloch, & King, 2018).  
Despite these challenges, blockchain applications have promising usefulness as a dis-intermediator in 
business sectors such as finance, healthcare, legal, and insurance. To emphasize these points, Rossi, 
Mueller-Bloch, Thatcher, and Beck (2019) stated that blockchain’s properties of automaticity, autonomy, 
and enforcement enable blockchain applications that create “smart property” wherein the ledger tracks 
and inventories these hard assets. Furthermore, the ability to use blockchains to autonomously implement 
trust and an unalterable state of truth has several sociotechnical implications that profoundly alter how a 
firm implements information systems in the context of its business logic and sociotechnical interactions 
between individuals and in society (Rossi et al., 2019).  
Overall, blockchain represents an exciting opportunity to change how we interact and exchange value with 
each other. The panel discussion corroborated these ideas by highlighting the legal implications of these 
“smart properties” in the form of crypto-assets and three widely used blockchain applications. In Section 3, 
we discuss the financial regulations landscape that influences how different regulatory organizations view 
crypto assets. 
3 Crypto-assets and the Financial Regulation Landscape 
Blockchain facilitates many innovative digital applications, assets, and organizations that raise concerns 
for financial regulators in the United States. Examples include smart contracts, decentralized autonomous 
organizations, decentralized autonomous applications (DAPPS), initial coin offerings (ICOs), crypto-
tokens, and crypto-currencies. Each panelist discussed an example application from these categories. 
U.S. financial regulators mainly care about the threat these digital assets present to financial security. The 
panel discussed how financial regulators have different areas of oversight and view crypto-assets’ 
regulation differently. Regulators may view crypto-assets as securities, commodities, money, or property. 
In Table 1, we summarize the key issues that the panelists addressed and the questions they raised and 
summarize their discussion pertaining to crypto-assets and financial regulation. 
Table 1. Key Issues that the Panelists Addressed and the Questions they Raised 
Key issues 
addressed 
1) What implications arise if SEC treated crypto-assets as securities in the US? 
2) What implications arise if FinCen treated crypto-assets as money in the US? 
3) What implications arise if CFTC treated crypto-assets as commodities in the US? 
4) What implications arise if IRS treated crypto-assets as property in the US? 
Key questions 
raised 
The complexity of the regulatory environment raises many pertinent research questions for the IS 
community. For instance, one can build regulatory oversight into blockchain applications.  
1) What theoretical approaches can we use to explain the implications that decentralized 
governance have in different contexts? 
2) How can we leverage know your customer (KYC), anti-money laundering (AML), and other 
existing regulatory approaches to deter individuals from using blockchain applications for 
criminal purposes? 
3) How can we predict or explain the impacts of “hard-forks” and the possibility of roll-back 
operations that can revert smart contracts to a previous state and reset blockchains? 
 
In the legal context, an overload of pending lawsuits clogs the legal system. 
1) How can we use blockchain protocols and AI to aggregate human judgment and make legal 
decisions to help alleviate this backlog? 
2) What kinds of legal decisions are amenable to blockchain-supported legal decision making 
(e.g., in smart contracts)? 
3) What legal and regulatory challenges do smart contracts present? 
Summary 
Different Federal organizations view crypto-assets differently, which creates conflicts in how they 
regulate blockchain-based applications.  
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3.1 Crypto-assets as Securities 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent federal agency, protects investors from 
fraudulent schemes and has primary oversight over the U.S. securities market. The SEC has taken a pro-
regulation approach and views crypto-assets as securities. Securities are fungible, financial instruments 
that hold value, such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds. The SEC ensures that 
investors receive information concerning securities being offered for public sale to prevent deceit, 
misrepresentation, and fraud. The SEC accomplishes does so by requiring companies to disclose 
important financial information through registering securities to enable investors to make informed 
decisions about whether to purchase a company’s securities. Under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), one must register all securities that one 
offers and sells in the US with the SEC, or the securities must qualify for an exemption from the 
registration requirements (Douglas & Bates, 1933; “Securities Exchange Act of 1934”, 1934).  
Though lawmakers established these regulations in the early 1900s, the SEC has applied these laws to 
crypto-assets such as ICOs. For example, SEC v. Howey (1946) established the guidelines under which 
an asset would be considered a security subject to SEC regulation (Tew & Freedman, 1972). The Howey 
Test states that a security involves 1) an investment of money 2) in a common enterprise (e.g., pooling of 
funds) 3) with the expectation of profit and 4) solely from others’ effort (passive investment) (Alcser, 1995). 
A crypto-asset must satisfy all four elements to constitute a security. Ultimately, the SEC does not 
regulate the technology itself but rather how one uses it and its consequences, which has two implications 
for blockchain-related initiatives. First, the underlying business that adopts the blockchain solution can 
issue a native security token (a crypto asset through initial coin offers) to raise capital and to assist with 
decentralized governance of the platform. Such a security token is a crypto asset which is tradable on 
platform exchange markets (Subramanian, 2019). Businesses that issue such tokens have to register with 
the SEC. Second, platforms that allow people to trade in such securities must register with the SEC as 
national securities exchanges unless they have exemption from such registration.  
3.2 Crypto-assets as Commodities 
The Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), an independent federal agency, protects market 
participants from fraud. The CFTC regulates futures and option markets in the US for commodities such 
as oil, grain, precious metals, and electricity. In CFTC vs. Patrick McDonnell and Cabbagetech d/b/a Coin 
Drop Markets (2018), the court ruled that the CFTC can regulate Bitcoin as a commodity (Girasa, 2018). 
Under this ruling, the CFTC has taken a “do no harm” approach to crypto-regulation. The CFTC focuses 
on facilitating an environment that properly balances regulatory oversight and innovation to allow new 
technologies and the American marketplace to evolve in a responsible manner. As such, the CFTC 
granted LedgerX, a Bitcoin derivatives exchange and clearinghouse, the right to create a regulated Bitcoin 
futures market. Despite this approval, the CFTC, in conjunction with the SEC and other financial 
enforcement agencies, has proactively collaborated on prosecuting cryptocurrency schemes that involve 
fraud and manipulation. The CFTC has already taken civil enforcement actions against several virtual 
currency Ponzi schemes such as My Big Coin Pay and Coin Drop Markets. 
3.3 Crypto-assets as Money 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
has full authority for KYC and AML matters. FinCen analyzes financial transactions to fight money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. FinCen views crypto-assets such as tokens as 
money (Bryans, 2014; Kiviat, 2015). In 2015, FinCen, working in coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s 
office, assessed a US$700,000 civil money penalty against Ripple Labs Inc. and its subsidiary XRP II, 
LLC, for violating the Bank Secrecy Act by acting as a money services business and selling its virtual 
currency, XRP, without registering with FinCen (Hughes & Middlebrook, 2016). Ripple also failed to 
implement and maintain an adequate AML program designed to protect its products from use by money 
launderers and terrorist financers. FinCen has registered over 100 virtual currency exchanges. 
3.4 Crypto-assets as Property 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, collects taxes and 
enforces tax laws. The IRS views cryptocurrencies as property. Therefore, as published in Notice 2014-
21, anyone who sells cryptocurrency for a profit will be subject to a capital gains tax. Payments received 
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or mined cryptocurrencies also have tax implications; payments using cryptocurrency to pay independent 
contractors, service providers, and employees are taxable. In 2018, the IRS ordered Coinbase, one of the 
largest cryptocurrency exchanges, to send information on 13,000 of its customers who used the exchange 
between 2013 and 2015 to the IRS to determine whether it should assess taxes for these customers. The 
IRS warned that taxpayers who do not report the income gains from their cryptocurrency transactions face 
the possibility of tax audits, penalties, and prosecution. 
In addition to the aforementioned perspectives, the complexity of the regulatory environment raises many 
pertinent research questions for the IS community. For instance, in some cases, can one build regulatory 
oversight into blockchain applications? Because blockchains regulate themselves, they could use hard 
and soft forks, which roll back smart contract transactions and reset blockchains to a prior state. However, 
a blockchain cannot automatically decide to implement hard and soft forks; they require human 
intervention. It remains unclear how legal agencies would view such fundamental alterations to these 
crypto-assets.  
While crypto-assets remain an important application, blockchains have a broader applicability for business 
processes. For instance, businesses have launched several crypto-assets in the form of ICOs, which 
ascertain the governance rules and facilitate trustful transactions among stakeholders. However, 
questions remain as to the types of business processes that suit blockchain technology. In Section 4, we 
explore this line of enquiry using three different blockchain applications as examples. 
4 Blockchain Opportunities Framework: A Case of Three Blockchain 
Applications 
Members in the IS community have considerably debated whether blockchain adoption provides any true 
business value to organizations and society (Rossi et al., 2019). To participate in this debate, we modified 
Pedersen et al.’s (2019) framework and used it to analyze three blockchain applications. Pedersen et al.’s 
(2019) framework helps decision makers decide whether to use blockchain technology and which type of 
blockchain to deploy. The framework provides 10 logical steps for analyzing whether one should use 
blockchain in a particular business application.  
However, note that Pedersen et al.’s (2019) framework does not account for the privacy issues that the 
GDPR raises. Accordingly, in the following examples, we apply a modified version of Pedersen et al.’s 
framework to account for an 11th decision step to determine when one needs to store personal 
information off the blockchain. We include the 11th step because a blockchain deliberately makes data 
modification or deletion difficult (i.e., to achieve “immutability”). However, the GDPR requires that one 
modify (Article 16) or erase (Article 17) data under certain circumstances. The right to erasure (i.e., “right 
to be forgotten”) in particular creates tension between blockchain and the GDPR. Therefore, blockchain 
architects need to recognize these requirements from the outset and ensure that they design their 
respective use cases in a manner that allows compliance with the GDPR. One approach to complying with 
the GDPR requirements in Articles 16 and 17 involves implementing off-chain personal information 
storage (Fink, 2019). We integrated Fink’s approach into Pedersen et al.’s framework because we believe 
that such an approach can effectively allow one to modify or delete data once people invoke their right to 
be forgotten.  
4.1 Modified Pedersen et al. (2019) Framework for Off-Chain Data Storage 
Depending on the specific blockchain use case, it may not be prudent to store transactional data on the 
blockchain itself. One could store such data in an off-chain database and link it to the distributed ledger 
through a hash pointer. To comply with the GDPR requirements, one should (where possible) keep 
classified data (such as personal data) off the chain and link it to the blockchain ledger through a hash 
pointer (Fink, 2019). More specifically, the hash pointer would only contain information needed to access 
the personal data in the separate database. In this manner, one could confine personal transactional data 
to off-chain storage and avoid storing such data on the blockchain. Thus, off-chain storage would enable 
one to modify and erase personal data stored off-chain in databases in compliance with Articles 16 and 17 
of the GDPR. An open question concerns the status of the remaining hash when one erases the off-chain 
data because that hash will remain permanently on the blockchain ledger.  
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The 11th step that we propose involves determining how to deploy blockchain technology to store 
personal data. If transactional data contain personal data, then the blockchain ledger should store only a 
hash pointer to personal off-chain data.  
Using the extended framework in Figure 1, where we show the 10-step decision path to determine when 
to use blockchain technologies Pederson et al. (2019) and the 11th rule that we added (to enhance 
privacy and security of sensitive information and support the Rights to Be Forgotten and Data 
Modification), we analyzed three different blockchain applications: Etherisc (a smart contract-based 
insurance application), a blockchain-based healthcare information-sharing application, and Bitcoin.  
 
Figure 1. Decision Path for Using Blockchain (Adapted from Pederson et al., 2019) 
In Sections 4.2 to 4.4, we highlight the three blockchain applications and how Pedersen et al.’s (2019) 
modified framework would apply to these applications.  
4.2 Etherisc: A Smart Contract-based Insurance Application 
Nick Szabo (1997) provided the earliest known definition of smart contracts:  
The basic idea behind smart contracts is that many kinds of contractual clauses (such as 
collateral, bonding delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in the hardware and 
software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract expensive for the breacher. 
Ethereum, a blockchain platform, enables smart contracts by providing a distributed, reliable, and 
verifiable contract enforcement mechanism through software code. Smart contracts provide consensus 
mechanisms (e.g., proof of work, proof of stake, proof of authority) and an auditable trail of contract 
execution that can reduce legal institutions’ involvement and penalties by reducing potential breaches and 
conflicts during contract execution.  
Etherisc, a smart contract protocol, allows one to build DAPPS that cater to the insurance industry to 
automatically process insurance claims based on a triggering event (Etherisc, 2018). Etherisc-based 
DAPPS such as Flight Delay (see https://fdd.etherisc.com/) run on Ethereum’s virtual machine blockchain 
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and encode entire insurance workflows including policy pricing, policy issuance, claims processing, claims 
settlement, and payout. Such smart contracts require an external component—a third-party data source 
called the “oracle”—that triggers the blockchain to execute contracts via application program interfaces 
(APIs). For example, once Etherisc detects a flight delay from the oracle and validates contractual 
conditions, the smart contract bytecode executing on Ethereum automatically processes the claims 
transfers money to the insured party. In this scenario, the oracle sources data from sources such as flight 
trackers, weather databases, KYC data, and banks and provides this input to the smart contract. 
We summarize the key issues that the panelists addressed and the questions they raised with respect to 
Etherisc in Table 2. Subsequently, we discuss key insights and discussions from the panel.  
Table 2. Key Issues that the Panelists Addressed and the Questions they Raised Pertaining to Etherisc 
Key issues 
addressed 
 What are smart contracts? How can we use them to create a decentralized insurance 
application marketplace? 
 How do smart contracts play a role in enabling a decentralized insurance marketplace? 
 How can we analyze whether blockchain presents an appropriate business opportunity in the 
decentralized insurance marketplace? 
Key questions 
raised 
Smart contracts raise the following research questions pertinent to IS scholars: 
1) Protocol functionalities that link multiple smart contracts will create complex interoperable 
frameworks across multiple organizations. What kinds of protocol frameworks will assist one 
in creating smoother cross-functional and cross-organizational business process functioning? 
2) How will different actors in a particular industry benefit from specific smart contract 
applications? For example, in the insurance segment, how will market participants, such as 
underwriters, insurance agents, resellers, and insurance providers, benefit from the smart 
contract functionality that Etherisc provides?  
3) How can we design smart contracts to overcome barriers to interoperability?  
4) How can we standardize smart contract languages to operate on different blockchains?  
5) What risks do smart contracts present? What auditing tools and services do we need to 
reduce these risks? 
Summary 
Though smart contracts provide an efficient mechanism for creating decentralized applications in 
the insurance sector, issues with respect to system-level and blockchain-/smart contract-level 
interoperability remain. 
4.2.1 Decentralization of Insurance 
Among other reasons, one could implement a decentralized approach to insurance to align incentives in 
insurance contracts whereby insurance firms, insurance agents, and customers engage in profit-
maximizing activities with different incentives (Sheth & Subramanian, 2019). Such market behavior leads 
to overly restrictive insurance contracts due to a financial interest in not paying out claims on time. Smart 
contracts incentivize efficiency and facilitate a broad innovation base by pooling risks among different 
participants. Current Etherisc insurance products include Flight Delay, Hurricane Guard, Collateral 
Protection, Crop Insurance, and Social Insurance. These products use modified smart contracts with a 
backend that includes an Ethereum blockchain and third-party APIs to price, underwrite, monitor, trigger, 
and pay out claims. In Table 3, we propose how the Etherisc Flight Delay Insurance application benefits 
from the blockchain using Pedersen et al.’s (2019) modified framework. As we show in Table 3, insurance 
applications such as Etherisc use permission-less public blockchains to provide a common database and 
an immutable transaction log, which provides access to the public and avoids the need for third parties but 
requires off-chain personal data storage. 
Depending on the investment mode and how one sells insurance products (e.g., via crypto-tokens), one 
may implement blockchain-based insurance DAPPS such as Etherisc as ICOs that may fall under U.S. 
securities regulation. One should also store personal data off chain to comply with the GDPR’s right to be 
forgotten and modify personal data. Such an application will also have to comply with insurance 
regulations. 
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Table 3. Pedersen et al.’s (2019) Modified Framework Applied to Etherisc Real-time Flight Delay Insurance 
Need for 
common 
database 
 Provides a single view of the insurance policy and related transactions to multiple parties. 
 Enables multiple parties involved in a transaction (e.g., insurance firms, an insured customer, 
and insurance agents such as travel companies) to track and maintain a claim’s status. 
 Allows one to validate the triggering event and whether insurance payouts occurred in real 
time. 
 Provides a log of all transactions and helps improve the main analytical model that models 
the risk profile of a particular insurance policy. 
Multiple parties 
involved 
 Insurance companies, insured individuals, insurance agents, insurance regulatory 
authorities, resellers,  Insurance validators, and intermediaries 
Involved parties 
have conflicting 
incentives/trust 
issues 
 Insurance firm wants to maximize its profits and reduce payouts. 
 Insurance agents who multihome have an incentive to sell only those insurance policies with 
maximum commissions. 
 Insurance resellers who multihome have an incentive to only sell those policies with 
maximum commissions. 
 Insurance customers want to protect against risk while paying the optimal price for the 
insurance policy (Sheth & Subramanian, 2019). 
 Insurance regulators want to provide a legal and operable market for insurance and protect 
customers. 
Participants 
can/want to 
avoid a third 
party 
 Third parties, such as insurance validators and actuaries, involved in this transaction 
increase costs to the insurance firm and to the insurance customer.  
 Third party can use data to model, resell, or upsell existing insurance policies on the market. 
 The market is straightforward, and one can make it efficient if one implements direct payouts 
and develops risk models to increase optimal profitability in the sector. 
Governing rules 
vary among 
participants 
 For insurance firms, the governing rules stem from their ability to create configurable, 
affordable insurance policies that they can customize to individual customers. 
 For the resellers and insurance agents, their governing rules imply reducing the costs to 
reach out to end consumers and have the ability to sell it to them. Therefore, configurability 
presents a disincentive to agents and resellers because the time taken to sell increases with 
product variation. 
 For insurance validators, the key governing rule involves proving beyond reasonable doubt 
that the event of interest occurred, such as a flight delay, and that everyone accepts their 
proof. 
 For the insurance customer, rules that govern the processing of claims include that the policy 
should repay him the amount for which he has been insured if a flight delay event occurs. 
Rules of 
transactions 
remain 
predominantly 
constant 
 Consistent transactions.  
 The governing rules for each agency in this relationship remain the same. 
 Individual insurance firms/participants and policy sellers can participate according to their 
smart contract rules. 
Need for 
immutable log 
 To provide for non-repudiability of each transaction that has occurred on the blockchain (as 
validation mechanisms in case of a future event). 
Governance 
allows for 
public network 
access 
Anyone in the public domain can access Etherisc including: 
 Insurance company 
 Insured individual 
 Insurance agent  
 Insurance regulatory authority 
 Resellers 
 Insurance validators and intermediaries 
Public 
transactions? 
 Yes. Etherisc has a permission-less public blockchain design and anyone can access the 
smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain and observe its execution. 
 Nevertheless, oracles, which Etherisc uses as a source of KYC, AML, and personal data, 
protect consumer data. 
Off-chain 
personal data 
storage 
required? 
 One needs to store personal data to process insurance-based smart contracts. 
 This system requires off-chain personal data storage to facilitate parties’ right to be forgotten 
and right to modify data. 
197 Blockchain Regulations and Decentralized Applications: Panel Report from AMCIS 2018 
 
Volume 47 10.17705/1CAIS.04709 Paper 9 
 
4.3 Healthcare Information Sharing 
Healthcare providers and other relevant actors have generated much patient- and health-related data from 
implementing electronic health records. These data help healthcare providers improve healthcare 
outcomes and facilitate research that improves care quality. However, frameworks that today’s hospital 
systems use for digitizing health processes digitization lack efficiency due to poor data quality. Major 
stakeholders such as insurance providers, practitioners, and patients often have an erroneous and 
incomplete copy of health records. Given that healthcare providers have begun to introduce sensor-based 
data for tracking and monitoring patients’ health, we can expect volumes of health data and their 
associated quality issues to increase exponentially. Such exponential growth calls for systems and 
processes that can consolidate and distribute health data in a reliable way. One popular solution is the 
HIE. In Table 4, we summarize the key issues that the panelists addressed and the questions they raised 
with respect to HIEs. 
Table 4. Key Issues that the Panelists Addressed and the Questions they Raised Pertaining to Healthcare 
Information Sharing 
Key issues 
addressed 
 What importance do blockchains have with respect to health information data? 
 Do blockchains present an appropriate business opportunity in the decentralized, personal 
healthcare information-exchange system? If so, why? 
Key 
questions 
raised 
We present the panelists’ views on important research questions in this area that could interest the 
IS community at large: 
1) Can one securely share protected healthcare information (PHI) on the blockchain? If so, how 
would such a system impact both health outcomes and patient satisfaction? 
2) How can one implement off-chain PIH storage? How can one implement a hash pointer for off-
chain to reduce the risk of identification from the hash once one deletes personal off-chain 
data?  
3) How will blockchain-based systems such as HIEs or clinical data pathways help resolve 
interoperability challenges across heterogeneous healthcare systems? 
4) How will blockchain-based healthcare systems affect provider efficiency and cost of care? 
Summary 
Although blockchains present a secure, privacy-enabled, and accurate mechanism to store and 
exchange healthcare information, we need to study issues that arise from legacy healthcare system 
integrations and analyze benefits to end users in terms of improving cost and healthcare efficiency. 
We need to develop efficient methods to implement off-chain PIH data storage. 
In research settings, HIEs have enabled multiple providers to collaborate and, thus, reduce the extent to 
which they duplicate medical procedures (Bardhan, Ayabakan, Zheng, & Kirksey, 2014), lower costs, and 
improve patient health outcomes (Saef, Melvin, & Carr, 2014). In practice, HIEs have suffered from 
sustainability issues (Kruse, Regier, & Rheinboldt, 2014) and experienced varying degrees of success. 
Barriers to HIE adoption include privacy concerns, technical barriers due to incompatible systems, and 
limited interoperability among heterogeneous healthcare systems (Furukawa et al., 2014). These barriers 
only grow in contexts where providers share anonymous healthcare information with the public. A 
blockchain-based HIE can potentially enable one to securely share health information (Dubovitskaya, Xu, 
Ryu, Schumacher, & Wang, 2017; Ichikawa, Kashiyama, & Ueno, 2017) across multiple participants. 
Broadly, a generic blockchain-based solution for sharing healthcare information could include the following 
features: 
1) At the patient level, the solution would store each health encounter as a transaction in a block. 
Due to blockchain’s immutability and ability to enable permission-based access using 
cryptographic protocols, the blockchain would constitute a single “source of truth” for an 
individual patient’s record. 
2) Patients can save various types of health data, collected through different devices, onto the 
blockchain.  
3) Patients may grant permission to different players in the healthcare system to view and insert 
information into their records as needed for treatment and billing.  
4) The consolidated patient information saved on the blockchain can potentially reduce the extent 
to which providers duplicate diagnostic and treatment procedures, which can improve health 
outcomes and reduce costs. 
5) Multiple entities such as insurance providers would validate transaction in a decentralized 
fashion via a peer-to-peer system.  
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In the panel, we discussed how one could use blockchain technology to develop a prototype for sharing 
treatment data among breast cancer patients. In this solution, corresponding peers on the network would 
securely share data pertaining to patients. Patients, doctors, and hospital systems in the network receive 
permission to participate in various network functions such as requesting patients’ records and accessing 
clinical pathways for treatment and other diagnostic-related information. Because such records reside on 
the blockchain and actors transfer them directly from the hospital system, this approach has three 
advantages: 1) immutability: one cannot alter the healthcare record, 2) accuracy: the network contains 
accurate data because consensus from the peer-to-peer network verifies each record, and 3) privacy: one 
can design the application to protect the privacy of healthcare information. This approach results in a true 
and validated repository of clinical pathways. Patients often drive current peer-to-peer patient networks, 
and they lack a mechanism to ascertain data’s accuracy and authenticity on the network. In Table 5, we 
analyze the aforementioned healthcare application using Pedersen et al.’s (2019) modified framework. As 
the table shows, the healthcare applications such as those used in online patient communities may use 
permissioned public blockchains to provide a common database and an immutable transaction log, which 
provide access to multiple healthcare organizations and peer-to-peer access. Such a healthcare 
blockchain-based application avoids the need for third parties but requires off-chain personal data 
storage.  
Table 5. Pederson et al.’s (2019) Modified Framework Applied to Blockchain Applications in Online Patient 
Communities 
Need for common 
database 
 Provides a single view of patient data 
 Enables patient matching 
 Enables one to mine past treatments to assess significance of specific patient-
reported outcomes 
Multiple parties involved 
 Patients with different variations/at different stages of the same disease 
 Patients with different treatments 
 Patients with different health outcomes 
 Patients with different mental, socioeconomic outcomes 
 Patients from different geographic regions 
 Hospitals and doctors provide medical records at patients’ request 
Involved parties have 
conflicting 
incentives/trust issues 
 Newly diagnosed patients care about the validity of the information that other 
patients provide. 
 Survivors participating in the platform care about 1) the privacy risks associated with 
sharing personal health information and 2) third parties’ misusing health information 
(e.g., insurance firms that might refuse future coverage). 
Participants can/want to 
avoid a third party 
 Having all patients’ posts verified by a qualified moderator would require 
tremendous resources. 
Governing rules vary 
among participants 
 The platform offers various levels of privacy depending on patient preference. 
 Blockchain rules allow survivors to specify the participants authorized to view the 
data. 
 Tracking of all sharing transactions increases the accountability of the patients 
posting the information. 
Rules of transactions 
remain predominantly 
constant 
 In each patient category, the same rules apply at all times. 
Need for immutable log  To increase accountability of patients posting information 
Governance allows for 
public network access 
 Patients have the right to share their own data with other patients and with 
healthcare organizations.  
Public transactions? 
 Transactions are not public but are shared with peers and multiple healthcare 
organizations.  
 A permissioned public blockchain is recommended. 
Off-chain personal data 
storage required? 
 This system requires off-chain personal data storage to facilitate parties’ rights to be 
forgotten and modify data. 
 For added privacy and security, blockchain stores hash pointer to off-chain personal 
health information. 
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Depending on the investment mode (e.g., via purchasing a crypto-token), healthcare DAPPS may require 
compliance with U.S. securities regulation. If entities such as healthcare providers, healthcare plans, and 
healthcare clearinghouses participate in sharing personal health information via the healthcare DAPPS, 
they need to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Assurance Act of 1996. Off-chain personal 
data storage will also facilitate compliance with the GDPR’s requirements for people to exercise their 
rights to be forgotten and to modify personal data. 
4.4 Bitcoin:  a Peer-to-peer Payment System 
In Table 6, we highlight Bitcoin, a blockchain-based cryptocurrency. Bitcoin network participants trust that 
the blockchain constitutes a neutral source of truth (Subramanian, 2017). The Bitcoin blockchain 
represents the first case of a decentralized autonomous system with distributed control (Anderson & 
Bogusz, 2019). However, the open source community can still manipulate it through forks and modifying 
its source code—a process that researchers often refer to as generativity (Anderson & Bogusz, 2019). 
Table 6 describes the key issues that the panelists addressed and the questions they raised pertaining to 
decentralization in the Bitcoin blockchain. 
Table 6. Key Issues that the Panelists Addressed and the Questions they Raised Pertaining to Bitcoin’s Peer-
to-peer Payment System and Decentralization 
Key issues 
addressed 
 What importance does decentralization have in a peer-to-peer payment system such as 
Bitcoin? 
 What components in the Bitcoin sociotechnical ecosystem contribute to this decentralization? 
 Does the Bitcoin blockchain present an appropriate business opportunity for a decentralized 
peer-to-peer value-transfer system? 
Key questions 
raised 
The following research questions explore the key challenges that the Bitcoin ecosystem faces: 
1) What design mechanisms in the blockchain ecosystem will ensure that a single entity in the 
ecosystem can never dominate the network? 
2) What risks do centralized components in the blockchain ecosystem pose? 
3) While different components in the Bitcoin system relate to one another, how can networks of 
influencers and policy makers design effective governance mechanisms to prevent 
centralization? 
Summary 
Centralization poses several risks; nevertheless, with Bitcoin’s enablement of peer-to-peer asset 
transfer, incentive mechanisms constitute one component in Bitcoin’s ecosystem that we will need 
to address to provide a true peer-to-peer decentralized value exchange. 
Centralizing any component in a blockchain ecosystem poses a threat to blockchain’s neutrality and 
decentralized trust (Murray, 2019). Bitcoin’s ecosystem comprises six main components: miners, node 
implementors, bitcoin implementations, developers, exchange operators, and investors. As a peer-to-peer 
payment system, Bitcoin’s founders envisioned a decentralized, autonomous, and network-based 
validation system that facilitates value exchanges pseudonymously. In Table 7, we apply Pedersen et al.’s 
(2019) modified framework to evaluate whether one can suitably apply blockchain to Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer 
value-exchange solution. Blockchain technologies suit efforts to design cryptocurrencies such Bitcoin. As 
Table 7 shows, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin use permission-less public blockchains to provide a 
common ledger and an immutable transaction log, which provide access to the public, avoids the need for 
third parties, and do not require off-chain personal data storage. 
Given the conflicting incentives among the different stakeholders in the Bitcoin ecosystem, we calculated 
the Gini coefficient of each component in the Bitcoin ecosystem from various Bitcoin data sources to 
determine their concentration (see Table 8). The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of distribution that 
gauges inequality. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect equality (an equal distribution condition), and 
a Gini coefficient of 1 represents perfect inequality (highly concentrated). We can see from Table 8 that 
five out of six components were centralized (i.e., Gini > 0.70). 
From these results, we inferred that a small number of exchanges control most of the cryptocurrency 
deposits and transactions. We observed that most Bitcoin nodes that transmit transactions and perform 
checks such as double spending reside in a few countries. For example, with Bitcoin, a country’s 
government can disrupt the Bitcoin network if it decides to terminate all Bitcoin nodes. Similarly, the small 
number of source code versions (or Bitcoin protocol implementations) suggests a high concentration of 
blocks mined per implementation. If this small number of implementations develop bugs or have security 
vulnerabilities, they could easily affect how the entire Bitcoin network functions. 
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Similarly, disagreements on technical directions for developing the source code could lead to incompatible 
blockchains through four different means: pseudo-forking, development forking, bifurcation, and speciation 
(Anderson & Bogusz, 2019). Consequently, if the top 10 core developers who contributed to the 
cryptocurrency software code colluded maliciously, they could disrupt the crypto-ecosystem’s 
decentralized and neutral nature.  
In the future, although the underlying algorithms support decentralization, the concentration of power in 
the six components could prevent the Bitcoin ecosystem from realizing the full potential of a decentralized 
architecture. 
Table 7. Pedersen et al.’s (2019) Modified Framework Applied to Bitcoin’s Blockchain as a Peer-to-peer Value-
exchange Solution 
Need for common 
database 
 Enables senders and receivers to track transactions between themselves. 
 Validates whether the sender has the requisite balance to transfer to the receiver or 
not 
 Provides a log of all transactions perennially 
Multiple parties 
involved 
 Investors (senders and receivers), Bitcoin miners, node implementers, Bitcoin code 
maintainers (developers), exchange operators, regulators and government 
Involved parties have 
conflicting 
incentives/trust issues 
 Sender needs assurance that the transfer has happened and needs the ability to view 
the transaction in near real time. 
 Miners have the incentive to select those transactions with the highest transaction fee. 
 Receivers have incentives to track transactions in real time.  
 Developers want to improve the network’s speed and provide for redundancy. 
 Miners do not want to implement hard/soft forks due to uncertainty in rewards. 
Participants can/want 
to avoid a third party 
 Third parties involved in value exchange transfers often charge a transaction fee, 
which makes certain types of transactions difficult. For example, micro-lending or 
micropayments have higher transaction fees compared to the value exchanged. 
 Third parties often compromise transactions’ security and privacy by sharing (storing) 
transaction details without senders’ and receivers’ explicit consent. 
 Third-party transactions have high fees when peer-to-peer value exchange happens 
using conventional payment transfer methods. 
Governing rules vary 
between participants 
 For the sender, the money has to reach the receiver in near real time with confirmation 
of the transaction available publicly. 
 For the transaction’s value to remain fixed and to be given access to the exchanged 
fiat currency,  access must be limited to the true identity of the participants on the 
network.  
Rules of transactions 
remain predominantly 
constant 
 Transactions are consistent and follow the same sending and receiving process.  
 Transactions should be consummated in a definite period. 
Need for immutable log  To provide for non-repudiation of each transaction by the sender and receiver. 
Governance allows for 
public network access 
 Yes; by design, the Bitcoin blockchain allows public access. 
Public transactions?  Permission-less public blockchain by design  
Off-chain personal data 
storage required? 
 Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous by design and does not need to store personal data. 
Does not require off-chain personal data storage.  
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Table 8. Description of the Ecosystem Components, Data Sources, and Gini Coefficients
1
 
Ecosystem 
Component 
Data source Unit of measurement 
Gini 
coefficient 
Implications 
Exchanges 
Coinmarketcap.
com 
Value of transactions in 
billions of USD on Bitcoin 
exchanges 
0.718 
Highly concentrated. A minority of 
Bitcoin exchanges control a 
majority of Bitcoin transactions, 
such as Coinbase and Binance. 
Miners Blockinfo.com Blocks mined per mining pool 0.370 
Equitable distribution. Mining 
power is widely distributed across 
mining pools. 
Nodes Nodes.info 
Number of Bitcoin transaction 
nodes per country 
0.844 
Highly concentrated. Nodes are 
located in a few countries, primarily 
the US and Germany. 
Implementations Blockinfo.com 
Blocks mined per code base 
(collection of source code) 
0.901 
Highly concentrated. Bitcoin is 
mined using few implementations. 
Developers 
github.com/bitc
oin 
Number of commits of Bitcoin 
source code per developer on 
GitHub 
0.894 
Highly concentrated. Only a 
minority of software developers 
develop a majority of the code. 
Investors Block.info 
Binned values indicating count 
of wallet addresses with 
average number of Bitcoins 
per wallet—how much each 
investor holds 
0.790 
Highly concentrated. Only a 
minority of investors own a majority 
of Bitcoin holdings. 
5 Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
This panel highlighted important research avenues pertaining to blockchain regulations and decentralized 
applications. In this paper, we discuss the regulatory framework in the US and the European GDPR 
requirement for providing persons with the right to be forgotten and to modify personal data. Using this 
argument, we modified Pedersen et al.’s (2019) framework and applied it to analyze three decentralized 
applications: Etherisc (a Flight Delay insurance application), a health information-sharing application for 
cancer patients, and Bitcoin. We also include key research questions that the IS research community can 
pursue in future.  
In Table 9, we summarize important research questions that the panel members and the audience 
highlighted that can guide research agendas for the IS research community 
Table 9. Key Discussion Themes and Future Research Directions 
Themes Future research directions 
Regulatory landscape 
and its applicability 
1) Designing regulatory frameworks that application writers themselves or blockchain 
designers can build into blockchain’s and smart contract applications’ governing 
mechanisms  
2) How can one enhance contract theory and contract law to pertain to the implications 
of decentralized governance, especially in the smart contract context? 
3) Exploring and mandating legal frameworks for hard and soft forks and rollbacks as 
existing properties laws mandate 
4) Proposing blockchain protocols and AI to aggregate human judgment and legal 
decision making to alleviate backlogs 
                                                     
1
 Data updated on 5 June, 2019. 
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Smart contracts and 
interoperability 
1) Designing, implementing, and analyzing cross-chain smart contracts that are 
interoperable among blockchain-based and legacy systems without violating  
structured decentralization principles 
2) Developing frameworks to analyze the economic, technical, and social implications in 
terms of costs and benefits for all stakeholders in a situational environment wherein 
one rolls out a blockchain 
3) Developing models that analyze smart contract risks, smart contract auditing tools, 
and smart contract services 
Private and hybrid 
healthcare blockchains 
1) Designing, developing, and analyzing healthcare information (PHI) that enables 
secure and accurate information sharing 
2) Developing metrics to measure health outcomes, efficiency, and patient satisfaction of 
such blockchain-based information sharing—plausibly providing a feedback loop to 
these system designers 
3) Designing, developing, and analyzing how blockchain-based HIEs or clinical data 
pathways can interoperate with different blockchain or legacy systems across 
heterogeneous health care systems 
Risks that centralized 
blockchain ecosystems 
pose 
1) Developing, implementing, and testing design mechanisms in the blockchain 
ecosystem that will ensure the network’s non-centralization 
2) Developing, implementing, and testing risk-based models to analyze blockchain 
applications that depend on centralized blockchains.  
3) Developing a peer-to-peer payment system that works with networks of influencers 
and policy makers who design effective governance mechanisms that prevent 
network centralization 
We hope the IS research community can leverage the research agenda we suggest above. 
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